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th at the Logos was present together (sunousia) with the soul. In other words, Eustathius seems to think th at the relationship was one of reciprocal presence, the soul dwelling with the Logos, and the Logos being present with the soul.2
This phrase is a good general description of the notions of the christological union held by not only Eustathius, but by Origen, D idymus and Theodore, and two points need to be m ade about the thinking it represents. (1) This description of the christological union was considered acceptable and, in fact, was accepted. It was not identified with the heresy of Paul o f S a m o s a ta ; when th at identification cam e it was in retrospect and incorrect. The four theologians with whom this paper is concerned had themselves no apparent misgivings th at their christologies were inadequate or suspect, and (with the obvious exception of O rigen) they explicitly denounced Paul as heretical. They saw no affinity between his christology and th e irs ; nor, apparently, did anyone else. A m ode of christological union " relative to m oral character or condition" is not necessarily adoptionist (although, o f course, it can be, and the conclusion that it always is is frequently and easily arrived at). W hile the union depends on the m oral condition o f the m an, Jesus, it need not have a beginning at some point in his life. It does not necessarily imply th at the m an, Jesus, had an existence for a tim e at least independent of the W ord. The theologians concerned take care to point out, with varying degrees of explicitation, th a t the m an, Jesus, was always united to the W ord. N one can rightly be called adoptionist.
(2) It is the central hypothesis o f this paper th at the theologians who taught a christological union of reciprocal presence shared an " idea of G od" (an obviously inadequate phrase, but anything m ore precise is too limiting) th at becam e less and less present in theological thinking after N icaea. I do not mean to say that exactly the sam e " idea o f G o d " emerges from the writings of the fo u r; we shall see that it does not. But their notions had in com m on a biblical rath er than a philosophical ground, an em phasis on the actions and attributes o f G od rather than on the " essence" o f God, distinct, at least in thought, from these actions and attributes. They m ade little or no use o f philosophical term s and concepts, not because (as some historians have suggested) they were unable to handle them , but because they felt that these were not the term s and concepts m ost appropriate to G od and C hrist. Their attitude was that epitom ized in the objections to hom oousios as unscriptural, and, as the fourth century went on, their theology took on an old-fashioned air.
This com m on bias accounts, at least in part, for their christologies. It becomes clear, as we read them , th at for each o f the four, there is a m arked and positive correlation between the notion o f God and the description of the christological union. The concept of the m ode of union th at each advances is a direct reflection of his notion of divine being and life, and is therefore the m ost appropriate, m ost intim ate and the m ost personal m ode th at could be thought of.
Origen
The " reciprocal presence" th a t Origen attributes to the W ord and, through the instrum entality o f his hum an soul, to the m an, Jesus, was that of contem plative union.
This same contem plative union -an adhering o f the mind and will in love -Origen sees as the bond between the hypostases of the Trinity. In each case the bond is m ost suitably described in this fashion because " knowledge" and " love" approxim ate most closely to O rigen's idea of G od.
T here has been considerable controversy concerning the m ost im portant form ative influences upon O rigen's idea of G od,3 but relative agreem ent concerning the lineam ents of th at God. H e is im m aterial (D eFaye and others assure us th at the stress O rigen lays on this point was necessary), pure spirit and totally one.4 He is totally transcendent, above everything, even being.5 Pure intelligence,6 he is nonethe less above all knowledge and wisdom, and is apprehended only by his W o rd .7 H e is goodness,8 and his very goodness is his only " lim itation" -he cannot do evil, cannot be what he is not.9 H e is lo v e 10 and his love destroys his im passibility, if by im passibility is m eant indifference.
The F ath er H im self, too, the God of the Universe, long suffering, and of great com passion, full o f pity, is not H e in a m anner liable to affection? A re you unaw are th at, when H e orders the affairs of men, H e is subject to the affections of hum anity?... The very F ath er is not im passible, w ithout affection. If we pray to him, H e feels pity and sym pathy. H e experiences an affection of love.11 H e is love, and here, I think, it becomes evident that R. M. G ra n t was m istaken when he wrote, " The conception of G od as love played little part... until we reach A ugustine's fam ous interpretation o f G od." 12 For arising from O rigen's notion of God as love is his conviction th a t loving is the action m ost characteristic of d iv in ity ; oneness in being is expressed in term s of love.
If G od the F ather is C harity, and the Son is C harity, the C harity, th at Each One is, is one; it follows, therefore, th a t the F ather and the Son are one and the same in every respect.13
God is love, and in love with himself, knowing him self and rejoicing in himself.
F urther, I ask w hether it is possible that glory belongs to G od over and apart from the glory which he has in the Son, and whether that glory which he has in him self is not greater than the contem plation which he has of the Son, for 3. Cf., among many, discussions in E. DE knowing is such an [integral] p art o f God. H e m ust be said to be penetrated by such ineffable delight and happiness and rejoicing, taking pleasure and rejoicing in him self.14 In sum m ary, then, while O rigen's God cannot be com prehended by man, he can be recognized in his m ost proper and characteristic attributes and actions, those which m ost intim ately m irror the Invisible, i.e. knowing and loving. It follows from this, for O rigen, th at the sharing o f this very " stuff" of divinity by the Father, Son and Holy S pirit is best described as a relationship o f mind and will. Speaking of the F ather and the Son, he says, " They are two distinct essences, but one in m ental unity, in agreem ent and identity o f will." 15 It is a union of knowledge, of contem plation, a m utual glory and delight. H. Crouzel explains how this is s o :
The representation which Origen advances o f consubstantiality (a representation which is found in the G reeks even after N icaea) is not the sam e as that o f Latin theologians. The latter distinguish the question o f source from that o f nature, and speak o f a divine nature which is the com m on property of the three... The Greeks, on the co n trary,... do not distinguish source and nature and show the Son consequently as born o f the essence of the F ather... T he divine nature is, therefore, the F a th e r's chief good and he com m unicates it to the Son and the H oly Spirit in the very act o f their generation or procession. Thus Origen is able to present the Son as constantly receiving his divinity from his contem plation of the F ather, or to affirm th a t he is constantly nourished by the F a th e r.16
To share knowledge and love, when the reciprocal object o f th at knowledge and love is the being o f the other, is to contem plate m utually, and when the beings th at are contem plating and being contem plated are best described as active knowing and willing, the natu re becom es identical with the com m unication of th a t nature. The fact or degree of O rigen's trin itarian subordinationism is not relevant to this paper, but it is clear that he sees the Son as sharing the F a th e r's nature and his constant references are to eternal g eneration.17 O rigen is not reluctant to describe this act o f generation as an act of knowledge and particularly o f will on the F ath er's p art -" the Son, whose birth from the F ath er is, as it were, an act o f his will proceeding from the m ind" .18 Because the divine will shares none o f the deficiencies o f hum an willing (want, desire, tem porality), Origen has no hesitation in calling the Son " the Son o f his will" .19 It is, in O rigen's theology, an affirm ation, rath er than the denial it was later to become, of full divinity. A nd, ju st as the expansive nature of divine knowledge and love gives birth eternally to the Son, so the Son derives his being from contem plating th at knowledge and love,20 and he is im age bepause he alone com pletely shares the will o f the F ath er.21 14 
Because Origen sees reciprocal contem plation as best doing justice to the unity and m ode o f union o f the three hypostases of the T rinity, it is not surprising that he sees this sam e m ode o f union as m ost appropriate to C hrist. The text is well-known, but it m ay be useful to repeat it here.
T h at soul of which Jesus said, " N o man taketh from me my soul" , clinging to G od from the beginning of creation and ever after in a union inseparable and indissoluble, as being the soul of the wisdom and word of G od and o f the truth and the true light, and receiving him wholly, and itself entering into his light and splendour, was m ade with him in a preem inent degree one spirit, just as the apostle prom ises to them whose duty it is to im itate Jesus, th at " he who is joined to the L ord is one spirit" . This soul then acting as a m edium between God and the flesh,... there is born... the G od-m an.
As a rew ard for its love, therefore, it is anointed with the " oil o f gladness" , th a t is the soul w ith the word o f God is m ade C h r is t; for to be anointed with the oil o f gladness m eans nothing else but to be filled with the Holy Spirit. A nd when he says " above thy fellows" , he indicates th a t the grace o f the Spirit was not given to it as to the prophets, but th a t the essential " fulness" of the W ord of God him self was within it, as the apostle said, " In him dwelleth all the fulness of the godhead bodily" .22
The christological union does, in O rigen's eyes, depend on the m oral condition of Jesus' hum an soul, i.e. on its " clinging" to G od, but it is in no sense a " m etaphorical" union. The union is intrinsic, not ex trin sic; it penetrates to the very core of C hrist's being, in fact, it constitutes C hrist in being (" there is born the G od-m an" ). Origen has m any phrases (some in the passage quoted here) th at lend themselves, because of the notion o f " rew ard " in them , to an im pression o f a " loose" union. H e counters in two w ays: (1) he asserts th a t this union has existed " since the beginning of creation" ; (2) he em phasizes the totality of the reciprocal presence. The presence is of the same order as th a t o f his " fellows" , but the degree changes the kind. Talking of " those who run in the odour o f his ointm ents" , Origen com pares C hrist to the vase containing the ointm ent. " As therefore the odour of the ointm ent is one thing and the substance of the ointm ent another, so C hrist is one thing and his fellows another." 23 The hum an soul o f C hrist and the W ord are " one spirit" in the sense of partaking o f the same being. T he key is the totality of the reciprocal presence -a totality th at moves beyond the highest point o f inspiration to the sharing o f the sam e life. As in the inner contem plation of the Trinity, the m eans of sharing -knowing and loving -are themselves the essence of th at life. It is a personal union because it involves, in O rigen's thought at least, those attributes and actions which are m ost proper and fundam ental to divine and hum an life.
W ith reference to the statem ent m ade at the beginning o f the paper th at the positing o f a christological union o f reciprocal presence was theologically respectable in the fourth century, three points should be noted concerning O rigen's thought.
(1) T he criticism th a t O rigen's teaching evoked did not touch on his description of the christological union, b u t rath er on his cosm ology and, in particular, on his teaching on 22 . DePrinc. II, 6,3. 23. De Princ. II, 6,6. the preexistence of souls.24 (2) Rufinus, always so concerned for O rigen's reputation, did not think it necessary to soften the christological text just quoted. W e have both the Greek and the Latin for a small p art of it -the part that talks of the union as the result of goodness -and the L atin is rather m ore forceful on this point than the G reek. The Greek is given here first.
It was on this account also th a t the m an became C hrist, for he obtained this lot by reason o f his goodness, as the prophet bears witness when he says, " Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity ; wherefore God hath anointed thee, thy G od with the oil of gladness above thy fellows" . It was appropriate that he who had never been separated from the Only-begotten should be called by the nam e of the Only-begotten and glorified together with him. To prove th at it was the perfection of his love and the sincerity of his true affection which gained for him this inseparable unity with G od, so th at the taking up of his soul was neither accidental nor the result of personal preference, but was a privilege conferred upon it as a reward for its virtues, listen to the prophet speaking to it thus ; " Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity, wherefore G od has anointed thee, thy G od with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.2' (3) Paul of S am osata was condem ned not for the theory of the christological union he advanced, but for denying the divinity of C hrist. It is certain that for alm ost two centuries after his condem nation theologians who decried Paul themselves taught a union of reciprocal presence. Paul is often accused of " rationalism " , and while this accusation often had little m eaning, it perhaps, as used by O rigen's intellectual heirs a t the Council of A ntioch, pointed to a basic difference in the notion of God held by Paul and O rigen. If P au l's concept o f God centred less on knowledge and love, then a union of reciprocal presence of m ind and will would not have been " tig h t" enough or " firm " enough or " intim ate" enough to be called " personal" . If, as later accusations ad d ,26 Paul was a Sabellian as well as an adoptionist, then his trinitarian theology, lacking distinct hypostases related to each other in knowledge and love, would not provide a coherent background to a christological union of reciprocal presence. An apersonal W ord could not relate personally to the m an, Jesus. If reciprocal knowing and loving is not seen as the very " stuff" of the godhead, then knowing and loving has less ontological reality, and hence, less plausibility as the basis o f the christological union. The two hundred years between Origen and N estorius saw, in fact, a lessening o f this plausibility.
Eustathius
There is not agreem ent on the theological stance of E ustathius of A ntioch. Present at N icaea, and a strong defender of its teaching, he m aintained his reputation for orthodoxy despite Eusebius o f C aesarea's accusation of Sabellianism and his 24 subsequent exile in 330. Som e m odern historians (e.g. Loofs and S ellers)27 think th at the accusation o f m odalism was justified, and see his christology to be dualistic, teaching an inspired m an. O thers (Zoepfl, S p a n n e u t)28 discern, under a cloak of biblical term inology, personalities in E ustathius' T rinity. Both schools recognize his insistence (1) on the unity of C hrist's person and (2) on his full hum anity. (Eustathius was one o f the first to see the im plications vis-à-vis A rianism o f a denial of C h rist's soul. Spanneut says th at his writings were am ong the m ost used and useful in Paulinus' fight against A pollinarianism .)291 am m ore convinced by the argum ents for E ustathius' orthodoxy than by those against. W hile I am appreciative of Sellers' excellent sum m ary o f E ustathius' teachings,30 I do not find th at his conclusions dem and agreem ent. Sellers (and others) are, it seems to me, reading E ustathius through later spectacles, not recognizing th a t here are ideas of G od and, consequently, of the union o f God and m an in C hrist th a t are corollaries. E ustathius' theology has a consistency o f its own, and owes little to the cast o f language and thought th a t was taking over fourth-century trinitarian and christological thinking.
E ustathius talks of God prim arily in term s o f his creative will and power and om nipresence.31 It is a them e th at is present in O rigen, but is subordinated there to knowledge and love. In Eustathius, it form s the basis of his theology. The Son is begotten and shares the divine n atu re.32 H e is the F ath e r's im age and works with him .33 Sellers points out th at " W o rd " , " S o n " , " W isdom " and " S pirit" are used virtually synonymously by E ustathius,34 and th at he calls the W isdom of G od " a divine and ineffable power" .35 W e need not conclude, however, with Sellers, th at E ustathius understands " pow er" as an im personal attrib u te.36 It is, rather, th at creative will and power seem to E ustathius to be " w hat God is all ab o u t" , as knowledge and love seemed to Origen. T herefore, to Eustathius, the m ost appropriate way o f affirming the sharing of the divine nature is the assertion of shared power and creative will.
T h at E ustathius understood the Son to be a distinct hypostasis, in the sense that Origen did, cannot be proven, but neither can it be disproven. C ertainly, if the accusation o f Eusebius was to carry any weight at all, distinction of hypostases could not have been a prom inent feature o f E ustath iu s' theology. Nevertheless, to argue th a t he ignored such a distinction on the grounds th at he used term s of divine power and operation to describe the Son is to ignore the m ainspring of Eustathius' theology. To repeat, for Eustathius, a sharing o f power and creative will is an assertion of consubstantiality.
In parallel fashion, for E ustathius the strongest assertion of C hrist's divinity was an assertion o f shared power and will brought about by the reciprocal presence of the W ord and the m an. Like O rigen before him , Eustathius, to underline the intim acy of the union, talks of it in term s th a t m ost closely reflect the reality o f the G odhead itself. Because he sees no distinction between the divine nature and the divine activity, divinity can best be characterized by its operation. The m ode of union he ascribes to C hrist is therefore k a t'energeian, i.e. according to action or operation.
E ustathius' account o f the descent of C h rist's soul into hell is inform ative of his notion of the m ode of union, and it is particularly illum inating to com pare it with O rigen's explanation.37 For O rigen, C h rist's hum an soul adhered to the W ord in will and was not touched by the horrors o f hell.38 E ustathius replies th at in this explanation O rigen seems to speak of a m ere m an, th a t he did not appreciate C hrist's divine nature, since voluntary adherence to G od can be attributed to all good m en.3' H e who speaks so inexpertly, E ustathius says o f O rigen, does not understand the W ord to be G od, who is present everywhere not so m uch by his will as by the strength (arete) of his divinity.40 The W ord was present to C hrist, enabling him to escape hell and save oth ers,41 and " the soul of C hrist lived with G od and the W ord" .42 The reciprocal presence of W ord and m an is best expressed for Eustathius in term s o f action. It should be noted th at Eustathius is intent on strengthening the christological union, of overcom ing the weakness he saw in O rigen's theory.
The W ord was not present to C hrist merely as he is to all creation, Eustathius notes, but rath er as a com panion-in-being.43 As a result of this " dwelling together" , this " presence" , the soul of C hrist was confirmed in strength.44 This notion of confirm ation is one Eustathius shares with O rigen, Didymus and Theodore. But the point to be noted here is th at this constancy is not the result of shared knowledge and love (although E ustathius would certainly recognize that sharing), but of shared power and action. It is a difference of priorities reflecting different apprehensions of the divine. Predictably, E ustathius sees the exaltion o f C hrist resulting in a further sharing o f divine power and operation.45 In each theology -th at of Origen and E ustathiuswe find th at the " prim ary bond" of the christological union, i.e. the constitutive bond, is expressed in term s th at represent the essence or fundam ent of the G odhead -for Origen, knowledge and love, for E ustathius, power and operation. Kelly and W olfson,46 am ong others, have pointed out the disinclination, which grew throughout the fourth century, to understand the unity o f the T rinity in term s of will. Theologians from the tim e o f Origen were capable of distinguishing between the generation o f the W ord as an act o f the F a th e r's will -to m ost a clear statem ent of subordination -and as the eternal, ongoing willing of the Father. In the latter case, " willing" is understood as either identical with the divine essence, or expressive o f it. N evertheless, the A rian use of an act o f volitional generation to explain the existence o f the W ord m ade any kind of voluntary union in the Trinity suspect. While the second creed of A ntioch (341) echoes O rig e n 47 in " three in subsistence, one in agreem ent" ,48 Kelly term s it " frankly pre-N icene in tone" .49 Only a year or two later, the docum ent known as " the creed o f Serdica" , em anating from the A thanasian party, condem ned the assertion th at the T hree were " one in harm ony o f will" , and insisted on unity of hypostasis.50 A thanasius in 358 him self m ade the distinction between the will and the nature of God, denying th at an act of the divine will resulted in the generation o f the W o rd : " A m an by decision builds a house, but by nature he begets a s o n ; and w hat is built at will began to com e into being and is external to the m ak er; but the son is the proper offspring o f the fath er's substance, and is not external to him ." 51 H e associated unity o f the G odhead expressed in term s of will with the A rians, and saw it as dangerously in a d e q u a te : " F or they [the A rians] say, since w hat the F ather wills, the Son wills also, and is... in all things concordant with H im , therefore it is th a t H e and the F ather are one." 52 The attention A thanasius gives to the question o f volitional unity in the T rinity reflects the th reat he saw there if the unity of God were m ade to rest on it, for, in his eyes, volitional unity asserts likeness in attribute and operation, not oneness in being. T he th reat was not im ag in ed ; the A rians had used " will" to subordinate the Son and, in the person of Eunom ius, were m aking a distinction between the divine substance and the divine operation to the sam e end. Although A thanasius certainly identifies in theory the substance and the will of G od, his em phasis in practice is on the divine substance as th at which the T hree share, because this em phasis is m ore in harm ony with his ontological conception o f G od as im m utable Being. " W ill" , on the other hand, has too m any overtones o f tem porality and m utability.53 By the m iddle of the fourth century, oneness in will a n d /o r power and operation, instead of being an assertion o f oneness in substance had become, to many, a denial o f it.
G rillm eier draw s attention to the lack of theological interest am ounting to tacit, if not outright, denial o f the hum an soul o f C hrist after O rigen.54 Such denial or. at 46 best, lack o f em phasis, of course m akes a christological union of reciprocal presence im possible. But to my mind, an equally serious im pedim ent to such a notion was the growing lack o f necessary support to be found in a parallel view of trinitarian unity. It is against this background o f lack of interest in the hum an soul of Christ and distrust o f unity o f will or unity of power and operation in the Trinity th at Didymus (313-398) taught, and it is this background th a t m akes his theological position all the m ore surprising. The treatise on the Trinity was certainly w ritten after 379; some place it as late as th e nineties. Oneness of substance and threeness of hypostasis had become, largely through the writings of Basil, widely accepted and, as Bardy rem ark s,56 we find the form ula on alm ost every page o f Didym us. H e is em phatic concerning the distinction and personality o f the T hree and, in the tradition o f those who stress this distinction, prefers to posit the F ather as the source o f divine being, rather than to speak of the divine being as a substance in which the T hree share. R ath er than an unquestioning, if philosophically inept, follower of A thanasius (a picture Bardy p a in ts57) Didymus strikes the reader aw are of the background by the independence o f his thought. Obviously instructed in the controversies of h alf a century earlier, Didymus explicitly denies th at the Son is the offspring o f an act of the F a th er's will. But even after S erdica's and A thanasius' insistence on speaking of the being of G od in ontological term s, D idym us repeatedly expresses trin itarian unity in term s of shared power, action and w ill: " [Father and Son] are other in term s o f hypostasis, one in divinity and agreem ent" .58 It is virtually a repetition of the second creed of A ntioch, with alm ost h alf a century and the victory of hom oousios intervening. D idym us talks, alm ost indifferently, o f the unity o f the divine nature expressed and revealed in unity o f will and operation, and o f th a t unity of will and operation resulting from the unity o f nature. O f interest is the passage (from Seven Dialogues on the Trinity) in which he has the anonym ous questioner ask for an explanation of one deity and three hypostases. D idym us refers him to G alatians 3,28 (diverse groups " one in C h rist" ):
D idym us
55. Cf. the discussion in E. D o u t r e l e a u , R echScR el 45 (1957) Didymus knew the folly of talking of the T rinity in hum an term s,60 but insofar as the Trinity can be known, it is by scriptural characteristics th at D idym us both apprehends and expresses divine oneness. The T hree are one in kingship,61 one in rule,62 one in pow er,63 in lordship,64 in will,65 in purpose of will,66 and in willing.67 I m ust again disagree with Bardy in his statem ent th a t Didym us was " too pious" to use hom oousios o f the Trinity, and so employed hom otim os (the sam e in honour), hom odoxos (the sam e in glory) and sundoxazom enos (sharing in praise).68 It seems rather th at D idym us was well aw are of w hat standard usage had become, was not entirely happy with it,69 and deliberately rem ained faithful not only to scriptural language, but to scriptural ideas about the being and oneness o f God. Perhaps the m ost significant in term s o f this paper is his characterization of the T rinity as a " society" ,70 a " sharing" , a " fellowship" .71
The full recognition and prom inence D idym us affords the hum an soul of C hrist is now widely known. His treatise on the Trinity is the earliest extant anti-A pollinarian writing, but he is also explicit in rejecting the heresy of Paul o f Sam osata, i.e. adoptionism and its consequent denial of the divinity o f C h rist.72 All who study Didymus tell us th at he was not interested in explaining the m ode of union in Christ. This m ay very well be true -his writings tend much m ore to the descriptive than to the analytical. N evertheless, his christological writing affords unm istakeable clues to the direction o f his thought on this m atter, and it faithfully m irrors the volitional and operational ten o r o f his trin itarian theology.
The hum an soul of Jesus was sinless and free; Didym us m akes these assertions over and over again.73 Jesus' soul was moved by those things th at move other hum an souls, but never to the point of sin.74 His total goodness was a unique gift o f God, arising from the presence to him o f the W ord. W e find in the C om m entary on the Psalm s the statem ent th a t Jesus' soul did not know sin because G od the W ord was present, a constant com panion to it.75 A passage from the T oura C om m entary enlarges on this p oint:
T hat soul is therefore unique [am ong m ankind] and different from others because it alone is always united to the W ord. N othing separates one from the otherneither m ental perturbation nor trouble.76 Didym us uses m onogenes -only-begotten, uniquely privileged -analogously o f the W ord and o f the hum an soul of Jesus. Each is unique in its own order of being. The W ord is the unique offspring o f the F ath er and so, analogously, because of the W o rd 's steadfast presence, is the soul o f C hrist. O f th at soul, he says:
" W hatever overcomes a m an, to th at he is enslaved." (2 Peter 2, 19) Certainly, it can happen th a t [souls] go from the true Lord to other m asters, and from one to an o th e r; th at results each tim e in different sins...
Thus because the soul o f Jesus was proven in all things [to be] in our resem blance, sin excepted (H eb. 4,15), it was never in the power o f any other than the one who assum ed it. T hat is why [God] calls it his only-begotten.77
The com plete absorption of the being of the W ord in the being of the F ather is m irrored in the com plete absorption of the hum an soul of C hrist in the W ord. This reciprocal presence of the W ord and Jesus' soul is radically different, in Didym us' eyes, from the relation o f other souls to God. The difference is clear: C hrist's soul is always united to the W o rd : " T hat soul is therefore unique, different from all others, because it alone is always united to [the W ord], N othing separated it from Him, neither reasoning nor reflection, nor trou b le." 78 The unique fullness o f that presence becom es the source o f salvation to others:
[Christ], who voluntarily ascended the cross... and, restored to life, by his own death killed death and reclaim ed all men from death. [Christ] , who by the exercise of his authority, strength and action brought a m ultitude o f men with him, [and gave] hope o f the resurrection to all hum an n atu re.79
This same notion o f uniqueness th a t results in shared salvific power and operation can be found in O rigen, E ustathius and Theodore.
G rillm eier rem arks th a t with D idym us " the freedom o f C h rist's soul is thus referred not merely to the undergoing of m oral proving in an earthly existence, but also to the preservation o f the divine-hum an unity itself." 80 I would add that in D idym us' christology not only does the soul of C hrist adhere freely to the W ord and so m aintain its condition o f sinlessness and its unique relation to the W ord -a relation of union -but th at the very m ode of union th at Didym us is here implicitly 
" M O RAL U N IO N " IN C H R ISTO LO G Y
advancing is exactly parallel and analogous to the unity he describes in the Trinity, i.e. reciprocal presence, shared will and operation.
W e have seen in O rigen a christological union o f reciprocal presence through contem plation, parallelling a trin itarian unity o f knowledge and love. Eustathius posits a christological union of reciprocal presence in term s o f shared power and operation, reflecting a theology in which power and operation express the very core of deity. D idym us has m arks of both, and is less clear and consistent than either. T rinitarian unity is certainly based on harm ony o f will, but the scriptural expressions o f the power and activity of God fill his writings. In term s o f the christological union, he is perhaps closer to O rigen. The constant, m utual presence o f the W ord and the hum an soul o f C hrist gives th at soul a unique status with salvific power. Let me repeat th a t for all three it is a " m oral union" insofar as it depends on the m oral condition of the hum an soul of C hrist, and it is em phatically not a " m oral union" in the sense of " m etaphorical" . Each has taken w hat he perceives to be the fundam ent o f the divine being, and cast the christological union in th at fram ew ork.
Theodore
Theodore o f M opsuestia continues the pattern established by Origen, Eustathius and D idym us, but with new and different em phases and a greater sophistication. One reason for the latter, o f course, is th at the christological disputes, properly speaking, have by his tim e begun, and he addresses him self directly to the mode o f union. His debt to O rigen is striking, and their differences are consistent with basically different notions of the relationship of God to the world. Theodore explicitly refutes the Eustathian theory o f union by power and operation. His own suggestion is union by good pleasure or grace -k a t'eudokian.
Theodore (ca 350-428) is a generation or m ore later than Didymus, and by his tim e trin itarian theology in the E ast had passed its creative period and had hardened into form ulae. T heodore seems to have been not only orthodox but unoriginal in this area. H e deals with trin itarian relations in the established term s (" one nature, three hypostases or proso p a "), and asserting still against the A rians the eternal generation of the Son, and denying th at the generation was an act o f the F ath er's will.81 U nlike the three earlier theologians, T heodore does not shy away from the term s " substance" and " n atu re" , and insists on the unity of nature am ong the Three.
By faith, indeed, we have known th at the F ather has a Son, begotten o f his nature, and who is G od like him. By faith, we have adm itted that... the Holy Spirit is o f the nature o f God the F ather, and th at he is always with the Father and the S o n .82
It may be recalled th at in 392 T heodore had been delegated to argue the case for the recognition o f the divinity o f the Holy Spirit before the M acedonians. It was, in his words, echoing Basil, from the acknowledged sanctity o f the Spirit that his divinity is k n o w n : " H e is holy by nature, therefore H e is G o d ." 83 This argum ent gives a clue to 81 Theodore s notion o f the divine nature. As well, eternity, im m utability and constancy are the tenor of his references to G o d ; in this, as in all else, God is not only selfsufficient, but source to o th e rs :
Truly, therefore, he is holy who neither changes nor transform s him self in his nature, and who has received sanctity from none other, but alone can give santity to those to whom he wishes.84 M oral im m utability will be the m ark of the divine in Christ.
G od's sanctity is m ade m anifest in his benevolent, creative will. C reation is the result of divine infinity and love. In all his writings, but especially in the Catechetical H om ilies, G od as creator is stressed. The two following texts are typical:
H e is au th o r of all things which cam e to be and have been m ade, which are far separated from his substance, and were created by his will when it pleased him .85 T hat which is eternal and is cause o f everything, that is God. A nd he who is not such, is not G od by n atu re.86
Two points should be noted in these te x ts : G od is creative " by n atu re" , and his creation is far separated from his substance" . This radical difference from Origen, i.e. the break th at Theodore insists on in the O rigenist continuum between C reato r and created, is reflected in their respective notions of reciprocal presence. R ather than express it in term s o f m utual contem plation, Theodore will talk o f grace given and grace received, resulting in an unw avering presence to each other of the W ord and the hum an soul o f Christ.
This notion of G od's grace, of his concern for and good-pleasure tow ards m an, is but another way, in T heodore's theology, of expressing the divine holiness and creativity. A series o f texts traces the history of this concern for the old and the new Israel the trium phs of the Old T estam ent, the end of the persecution of the church, the defeat o f heresy and, above all, the incarnation and the redeeming work of Christ.
Through my care [for them ] I shall be known to them , showing them th at I am really their God by the things through which I supply them with my special lasting g race.87 H e cam e to save men, in order th a t he m ight, by an ineffable grace and mercy, vivify and liberate those who were lost and delivered over to evil.88 Im m utability, sanctity, creativity, benevolence -the interrelation o f the divine attrib u tes forms a pattern from which one is tem pted to infer T heodore's notion of in tra-trin itarian relationships. But it could be only inference, and so a parallel cannot be established between the relationship of the persons of the Trinity and the christological m ode o f union. W hat can be plainly seen, however, is T heodore's notion o f the divine nature and its reflection in the relationship o f the divine and hum an in C hrist. " G race" is the term appro p riate to both. Theodore did not stum ble on the notion o f " grace" , " benevolence" , " good pleasure" to signify the christological m ystery. It was very thoughtfully chosen. R ichard has shown how little know n or used the term hypostasis was in the fourth and earlier centuries to describe the christological union.89 T heodore does affirm the single hypostasis o f C hrist in his controversial treatise, A gainst Apollinaris,''0 but the word was evidently not his choice, nor the choice of his contem poraries to express the m ost intim ately personal union. (R ichard indicates th at it had m onophysite overto nes.) The modes of union th a t T heodore exam ines and discards as unsuitable tell us a good deal about the one he adopts. The christological union is not according to substance (k a t'ousian), he says, because such a union would imply lim itation o f the divine.
A nd to say th a t God indwells anything as substance is m ost unfitting. F or it is necessary th a t he be som ewhere to enclose his substance in those things which he is said to indw ell; and he will be outside everything else. This is an absurd thing to say o f an infinite nature which is everywhere and is circum scribed in no place.91 T heodore evidently understands by the " substance" of God his general creative will which causes the beginning and continuance o f all being, but which does not suitably express any special relationships G od has with his creation. N or does T heodore like any better E ustathius' notion of union by power and o p e ra tio n :
The sam e can be said o f operation. F or either, on the one hand, it is necessary to lim it his activity to those things alone in which he is said thus to dwell, and how will it then be true th at God cares for and governs all things?... Or, on the other hand, it is necessary th at he im part his action to all things, which is thus proper and re a so n a b le ? 92 U nion according to power and operation (k a t'energeian) in no way accounts for the uniqueness o f C hrist. E ustathius solved this difficulty by attributing to C hrist a uniquely steadfast presence of the strength o f the W ord. T heodore picks up this them e, which was present also in O rigen and Didym us, and recasts it under the rubric of his predom inant idea o f God. inhabited, by good pleasure... By which we say that both natures are united and, following th at union, one person is effected.94 " As in a S o n " is the specification o f uniqueness, and for Theodore it m eans to inhabit totally. It is not only a tem poral totality, so th at the m an, Jesus, had no life independent of the W o rd 's presence (although th a t assertion is m ade m ore than once). T heodore s explanation o f " as in a S o n " is one of his m ost often quoted passages.
But w hat is it to indwell as in a S o n ? It is, by having indwelt, on the one hand to have united com pletely to H im self the assum ed m a n ; on the other, to have m ade him a participator of all the dignity which he who inhabits possesses, being Son by nature. W ith the result th at from union with Him he becomes a unique person [and] H e causes to com m unicate to him all his power. So th at it happens, and from which it comes, th at he operates com pletely in him to such a degree that H e even adm inisters the universal judgem ent through him and his parousia.95
As the W ord, the Son by nature, shares the totality of the F ath er's nature, so the adopted son receives the totality o f his good pleasure.
A n exegesis o f the passage quoted is necessary to show the richness and sophistication of T heodore's thought.96 In term s of the them e of reciprocal presence, I wish only to point out th at the totality of the presence of the W ord is m et by the totality of the m an's response, and th a t both are actions of grace -the first the benevolence o f the W ord, the second the grace received and responded to by the man.
W e shall say this also to be ju st and befitting the Lord, th at the W ord, because indeed he knew [the m an's] excellence by foreknowledge, and im m ediately, from the outset, at the beginning o f his form ation, indwelt by good pleasure and united him to H im self by the habitude of his will, and gave him a greater grace, so that afterw ards, from th at given to him , grace would be diffused to all men. Therefore, H e preserved (to himself) an incorrupt and sincere will concerning the good.97 T heodore attributes, as do his three predecessors, the salvific work of C hrist to the totality o f the presence of the W ord and the total adherence o f C hrist's hum an soul to the W ord. H e echoes all they have to say and adds a new dimension very much in keeping with his idea of God, whose act o f creation is the foundation of his more particularized benevolence or grace. A lone am ong patristic com m entators he interprets the " plerom a" of Colossians 2,9 as not only all " creatures" , led by C hrist to a new and excellent age, but " all creation renewed and transform ed in that renewal which, in grace, he gave" . 98 Two points concerning T heodore can be singled out in conclusion: (1) he seems to have m et the post-N icaean tendency to talk o f God and C hrist in more ontologically stable term s by his stress on sanctity as im m utability, w hether it is the sanctity of G od or the hum an sanctity of Christ, while retaining the biblical notions of creativity and w ill; (2) he has recast the notion of reciprocal presence in term s o f grace (it should be rem em bered th a t T heodore is an alm ost exact contem porary of Augustine) so th a t the incarnation is the response of the m an, Jesus, to th at expansive benevolence which is T heodore's basic notion of God.
The exam ination o f these four theologians has been an attem pt to show a close correlation between the understanding each has of the divine nature and o f the intra-trin itarian relationships and the m anner of the christological union. The m ode of union of the hum an and divine in C hrist th at each advances is a direct reflection o f his notion of divine being and life, and, therefore, the m ost appropriate, intim ate and personal. The constitutive bond is expressed in term s th at represent the " essence" o f the G odhead. (A parallel study would show, I suspect, th at for these theologians the core of being hum an is also knowledge and will.) Because the constitutive bond of the divine and hum an in C hrist is described in term s that represent the " essence" of the divine (and hum an), th a t union, while it depends on the m oral response of Jesus, is not at all " m o ral" in the sense of being m etaphorical.
